THE SERVICEMAN AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY
On December 15, 1950 the President of the United States
declared anothed national emergency and directed that-the
armed forces be enlarged to three and a half million men by
the Spring of 1951. With this tremendous increase in mobilization the problem of claims against the Government for
torts of setvicemen will become increasingly acute.
The initial axiom to be kept in mind is that the sovereign
is immune from suit.1 Accordingly, any right to sue the
National Government must spring from a legislative grant;
and all doubts will be resolved in favor of the sovereign.2
The Federal Tort Claim Act contains such a grant; it
recognizes that just as an employee's torts can judicially be
viewed as part of an ordinary employer's cost of doing
business,8 so can the torts of Government employees be
viewed as a part of the cost of Government.
The pertinent portions of the Federal Tort Claims Act
of 1945 are:
a. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) "District Courts . . . shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of, civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages accruing on or after 1
January 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the U.S., if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred."
b. 28 U.S.C. §2671 "Acting within the scope of his office
or employment in the case of a member of the military or
naval forces of the United States, means acting in line of
duty."
c. 28 U.S.C. §2764 "The United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title to tort claims, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest
prior to judgment or for punitive damages."
I Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U.S. 738 (1824); U.S. v.
Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1939).
2 Hammond-Knowlton v. U.S., 121 F.2d 192 (1941); For excellent
discussion on subject prior to Federal Tort Claims Act, see "Governmental Responsibility," 34 Yale L.J. 1, (1924), 36 Yale L.J. 1, (1926).
3 Prosser,Torts, 472, (1941).
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Corporal John Doe, ,while driving a vehicle of the United
States Government, negligently .runs into and causes injury
to a private citizen, Mr. Smith. Within. the provisions of
the above quoted sections of the Federal Tort Claims Act
lies Smith's. authority to sue the United States Government
-for Corporal Doe's tort.
L "Scope of Employment" or '"ine of Duty"
The Tort Claim Act, in the case of a member of the military services, defines "acting within the scope of his office
or employment.' to mean "acting in the line .of duty."14 The
formula "within the scope of his employment,"' vague though
it be, grew up to express vicarious liability in situations
where there was a degree of departure by the employee
from the kind of work he is employed to perform. Authorized
limits .f'.time and space and a purpose to serve the master
are factors bearing on whether this formula applies to
impose vicarious liability in a particular case.6
"In line of duty" has achieved whatever definiteness it
has in military understanding in the course of administrative adjudication of certain rights and benefits to which
servicemen become entitled as a result of injuries and diseases incurred in line of duty.8 In some respects this military concept has been extremely broad. So it has been held
that death of a soldier in a motorcycle accident on a trip .to
obtain personal laundry was in line of duty, that the death
of a soldier from drovning: on a tiip to obtain equipment
28 U.S.C. §2671.

a Restatement, Agency, § 228; e algo Proiser,Torts, 475.
Dept. of Law, U.S.
8 Supplementary Materials onElebientary'Law',
M.A., West Point, NX.Y. (1945).

"If there is an administrative finding

that disability or death was not incurred "in line of duty," the follow-

ing may be withheld: A. Digability benefits and pensions; B. Temporary insurance benefits; C. Burial Expenses; D. Medical and hospital
treatment and domiciliary care; E. Retirement benefits; F. Posthumous
appointments and promotions." "An administrative finding that dis-

ability or death was incurred as a result of misconduct usually results
in the following: A. Making good time lost; B. Forfeiting of pay for

time lost; C.Loss of six months' gratuity pay; D. Loss of medical care

after discharge; E. No admittance to Soldiers"Home; F. Unfavorable
type of discharge."
7Dig.
Op. JAG 1912-40, 960.
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was in line of duty,8 and that a soldier on farm furlough
who died of disease contracted without fault of his own was
in line of duty at the time of his death.9 Further, decisions
have been rendered to the effect that a soldier on pass injured while working in a cannery, an occupation encouraged
by the War Department to relieve labor shortage, was in
line of duty,10 that disability of a soldier on furlough while
assisting in extinguishing a fire was in line of duty since
failure to render assistance under such circumstances would
be a reflection on the military service;"' and that death of
an officer on duty status while engaged in normal and
proper recreation was in line of duty.2 Obviously this concept is a departure from the traditional agency concept of
"within the scope of employment."
On the other hand, there are limitations on the status,
"in line of duty," which may make the term narrower than
"scope of employment." "A finding of misconduct requires
a finding of not 'in line of duty.' ,18 Accidental death occurring to a soldier during an absence without leave,1 4 disability
or death of a prisoner shot while attempting to escape,15
and death of a soldier employed on a railroad resulting from
violating railroad rulese were held not to be incurred in
line of duty since resulting from misconduct. Since negligence and intentional infliction of harm may properly be
considered "misconduct," one might conclude that this
would take the serviceman outside the line of duty in most
instances where he injures another. However, apparently
simple negligence is not viewed by the military as misconduct, for the death of a soldier from negligent driving of a
government vehicle was held not to be the result of misconduct.17 Similarly, the injury of an officer in an auto accident when he failed to stop at a stop sign was held under
I

Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 956.
9 Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 971.
10 Bull. JAG, Nov. 1943, 478; Sec. IV, Cir. 321, WD, 11 Dec. 1943.
u Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 970.
Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 966.
22 Same as note 6, "Line of Duty Status," Sec. 1(3), 1945.
21 Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 972.
"5Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 973.
6 Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 970.
27Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 972.
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all the circumstances to be in line of duty and not the result
of misconduct,1s and the disability or death of a soldier
while trespassing on railroad property has been held to be
in line of duty and not misconduct, since trespass is not
such a violation of duty as constitutes misconduct. 19 Yet
certain 'types of gross negligence have b~en held to be sufficient to take the serviceman outside the "line of duty,"
due to misconduct. For instance, the disability or death of
a soldier in an auto accident caused by recklessly driving in
violation of speed -laws was held not in line of duty as resulting from misconduct.20 The death of a soldier due either
to intoxication or careless driving is not in line of duty since
'21
it is the result of "misconduct."
It is conceivable that the Congress intended by §2671 to
adopt the military concept of "in line of duty," as established
by the Judge Advocate General, as the test to determine
vicarious liability of the Government when servicemen are
involved. Of course, if Congress so intended, vicarious
liability would have been very wide in many instances, but
very narrow in others because of the military view that
certain types of misconduct take the serviceman's action
outside the "line of duty." Though the Federal Tort Claims
Act states in one section that "acting within the scope of
his office or employment" shall mean "acting in line of
duty, '22 another section states that the United States shall
be liable "under circumstances where the U.S., if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant. ' 23 The resulting inconsistency between "line of duty" and the "scope of employment" test which would determine the liability of a
private person has been resolved by the Federal Courts in
favor of the more familiar "scope of employment" test.
As a result of the adoption of the "scope of employment"
test the Federal Courts have held the United States not to
be liable for an accident resulting from the negligent driving of a soldier who had gone some 45 miles out of his
Bull. JAG, February 1944, 89.
IDBull. JAG, March 1944, 130; Bull. JAG, April 1944, 177.
-0Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 961, 962.
Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, 954.
28 U.S.C. § 2671.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).-
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assigned route but was on his way back to his assigned station at the time of the accident;24 not liable for injuries sustained when a sailor, who was travelling under government
orders, negligently ran into the plaintiff when running to
catch a train which was moving out of the station ;25 not
liable for negligent driving of an officer who was on his
way to a newly assigned station and had been granted a
15 day delay en route, though his orders directed that he
drive his own personal car ;26 and not liable for negligent
driving of a naval officer who was on weekend pass.27
Some of the above cases are reminiscent of the employer's
non-liability for torts of employees while going and coming from work, but are hardly consistent with the traditional military concept of "in line of duty." In the cases
above cited, it is clear that the Judge Advocate General
would have held that the serviceman was "in line of duty"
had he been injured at the time of the accident, and yet the
Federal Courts have denied liability of the United States
on the grounds that the said serviceman was not within the
"scope of his employment."
It is reasonably arguable that the relationship which
exists between a serviceman and the service should result
in broadening the application of the "scope of employment"
test. If "control" of an employer over an employee is to
be any criterion, vicarious liability for torts of a serviceman should perhaps be more readily imposed than in the
case of other employees. As an example, consider the case
of Bock v. U.S., wherein the Federal Courts denied liability
of the United States for the negligent driving of an officer
while proceeding from his old station in North Carolina to
his newly assigned station in Texas. The officer was directed to drive his own car, for which he would receive compensation upon arrival. At the time of the accident, he was
following the most direct route to his new station. During
the entire trip the officer was subject to the "control" of
the military forces (Military Police have authority to arCropper v. U.S., 81 F.Supp. 81 (N.D. Fla. 1948).
2 U.S. v. Campbell, 172 F.2d 500 (Fifth Cir. 1949).
'I U.S. v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (Fourth Cir. 1949).
27 Bock v. U.S., 92 F.Supp. 715 (S.D., N.Y. 1950).
21
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rest and confine members of the military at any time for
misconduct, even to include being out of uniform); and
further he would *have been subjected to penal action by a
Military Court Martial had he refused to go to his new
station or had he failed to arrive at the assigned time. Such
control over employees is completely beyond the comprehension of civilian employers. It is true that civilian employers may direct that an employee perform duties at
assigned places and times and the employee may be subject
to discharge unless he complies. In the case of a serviceman, however, compliance is insured by virtue of the threat
of punishment for non-compliance.
Due to this "control" which the service has over servicemen, it is seriously questioned whether there is complete
analogy to civilian employment, where a member of the
armed forces is involved. Therefore, it might be asked
whether the words, "under circumstances where the U.S.,
if a private person, would .be liable . . ." really prescribe
complete conformity to civilian "scope of employment."
IH. Application of Federal or State Law.
Having rejected the federal concept of "line of duty" as
a measure of the vicarious liability of the Government for
the torts of servicemen, the Courts face the issue whether
"scope of employment" is to be determined under Federal
or State law. The Federal Tort Claims Act precludes the
result of decisions under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act in determining whether State or Federal substantive
law is to apply. In Urie v. Thompson 2 s the United States
Supreme Court said, "What constitutes negligence for the
statute's [The Federal Employer's Liability Act] purposes
is a federal question, not varying in accordance with the
differing conceptions of negligence applicable under State
and local law for other purposes. Federal decisional law
formulating and applying the concept governs."
On the other hand, Section 1346 (b) of the Tort Claims
Act states that the United States shall be liable "under
circumstances where the U.S., if a private person, would
1

Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1948).
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be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred." 9 Whether this
choice of policy is better than that of the FederalPEmployer's Liability Act may justly be debated. Be:that as it
may, this provision of the Statute has resulted in consistent holdings to the effect that the State law applies3 0 In
applying the State test of "within the scope of his employment," the doctrine of "frolic and detour" has presented
itself on several occasions. There being a division of
authority as to the doctrine and its consequences,31 -the
Federal Courts have applied the law of the State in which
the accident occurred to determine the applicable rule, as
this is nothing more than a sub-division of the test of
32
"within the scope of employment."
2 Does the provision of this section change the rule of Conflicts of
Laws? "The place of the wrong the law of which governs torts is the
place where an injury is suffered rather than the place where the act
which caused the injury was committed." 15 U.J.B. §12 (a) (2), 8991.
It is suggested that it does not for the rule as to torts is usually stated
as, "the law of the place where the act or omission claimed as the
basis of the tort occurred governs . . ." 15 £.J.S. §12, 898, which is very
similar to the wording of the act. Obviously the first rule above quoted
has reference to the unusual situation where the act occurs in one state
and carries over to another state where the injury is inflicted as a
result thereof. Should this problem present itself under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, it is believed that the Federal Courts will also apply
the law of the place where the injury occurred.
30Long v. U.S., 78 F.Supp. 35 (S.D. Calif. 1948). See also: Cropper
v. U.S., supra.; Murphey v. U.S., 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950); U.S.
v. Eleazer, supra.; Bock v. U.S., supra.
u Prosser, Torts, 477. "As to detour cases various tests have been
proposed:
a. Makes the question turn primarily on the servant's motive in
the deviation (motivation-deviation test), saying that he is within his
employment while he intends in part to serve his master, or as soon
as he starts to return to his route.
b. The second test looks to the foreseeability of such a deviation
and holds the employer liable only for torts occurring in a "zone of
risk" within that which the servant might be expected to deviate.
Here the employer does not come into the employment until he is
reasonably near the authorized route."
82Lowe v. U.S., 83 F.Supp. 128 (1949); Cropper v. U.S., supra.;
Long v. U.S., 78 F.Supp. 35 (1948); Murphey v. U.S., supra.; U.S. v.
Johnson, 181 F.2d 577 (1950).
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IM. Applicability of. Local State Rules of Presumptions
Suppose that the accident occurs in a jurisdiction where
a statute is in effect which makes an auto-owner liable for
negligence of a person driving with the owner's permission
without regard to whether such person Was in the owner's
service. Or, again suppose that by -statute, mere ownership gives rise to an inference that the driver was acting
with the permission of the owner. Section 2674 states that
"The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances . .. " If one looks solely to these words,
it would appear that the intent of the Legislature was to
make statutes, of the type mentioned, as applicable to the
United States as to others. But §1346(b) provides that
the United States shall be liable for wrongful acts or omissions of employees of the Government, "while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances . . ." Interpreting this section, the Federal Courts
have held that a plaintiff may not avail himself of local
statutory rules that would aid in proving that the serviceman was "within the scope of his employment" at the time
of the accident.3 4 In other words, the Federal Courts have
said that even though the State test of "within the scope of
his employment" is to apply, the burden of proving such
a status is not to be relaxed .by local statutes or rules of
procedure. One explanation for such an interpretation
may well be the hesitancy of our Courts to remove the cloak
of Governmental immunities.
IV. Conclusions.
Justice Cardozo once said, "The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b).
uMurphey v. U.S., supra., State statute in effect creating a cause
of action against an auto owner for negligence of a person driving with
the owner's permission, without regard to whether such person was In
the owner's service, the court holding that the statute was not applicable to a suit in which the U.S. was involved as defendant. See also
Long v. U.S., 78 F.Supp. 35 (1948), and Hubsch v. U.S., 92 F.Supp. 874
(1950).
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has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction, where consent has been announced."' 5
As to liability for torts of servicemen, have not the Federal
Courts imposed an overly refined construction on the provisions of the Tort Claims Act? Have they not forgotten,
"It is a wholesome sight to see the Crown sued and answering for its torW'?
E. N. ROBINSON.
s Cited In Rushford v. U.S., 92 F.Supp. 874 (1950).
Maitland, Oollected Papers, 244, 236, (1911).
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